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STANLEY LEBERGOTT
OFFICE OF STATISTICAL STANDARDS, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
IT goes without saying that the most authoritative and succinct review
of the links between population growth and labOr force change appears
in the Book of Genesis.'It is difficult to decide how much more can
usefully be said on the subject. But there has been a welter of secular
experience since that report. And there have been some, excellent recent
studies of that experience.2
To an economist, the most interesting question may well concern how
population growth affects the extent of the market and the division of
labor. Certainly from the time that Smith emphasized the link between
the extent of the market and the division of labor, and Hodgskin fitfully
exorcised the Maithusian devil by insisting that population gains forced
further division of labor,3 these subjects have been worked ,over many
times—though not always to advantage.4 Fortunately, this vital topic is
in the competent hands of Coale and Kuznets.I shall therefore deal
with other aspects.
The essential and necessary relationship that links short-run population
and labor force change is simple to describe: there is none. A country's
population may rise, with no corresponding gains in its labor force. When
Chadwick and others brought sanitation to London in the nineteenth
'"Untothe woman he said .. .inpain thou shalt bring forth children ...And
unto Adam he said... cursedis the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat of it all
the days of thy life."
2Themost lucid and comprehensive contemporary study that emphasizes population-
labor force relationships appears as Chapter xr in the United Nations, Population Studies,
nO. 17,TheDeterminants and Consequences of Population Trends, 1953.Essentialcontributions
appear in the well-known studies by Durand, Jaffe, Wolf bein, Stewart, and Douglas as
well as less directly in the labor force analyses by Palmer, Miller, and others.
Scott Gordon, "The London Economist and the High Tide of Laissez-Faire,"
Journal of Political Economy, December, 1955, p. 473, quotes Hodgskin as
"an increase in population provides a larger market, permits a more extensive division
of labor." Hodgskin actually emphasized the euphoric impact of population gains on
technological changes.
Young's tautology is deservedly famous: "The division of labour depends upon
the extent of the market, but the extent of the market also depends upon the division of
labour." Allyn Young, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," Economic Journal,
December, 1928, p. 539.
Note: This paper was prepared while the writer was on leave from, and has no
connection with the work of, the Budget Bureau.
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century, when a more complex bureaucratic organization brought DDT
to Ceylon after World War II, sharp changes in mortality and in popula-
tion occurred, but without corresponding gains in the labor force.It is
equally clear that the labor force can rise without the population gaining
correspondingly: thus the enormous jump in our labor force during the
war took place with only limited change in the population totals.5
But while there may be no necessary tie, the size of the labor force
does in fact tend to be limited by the size of the population in an era of
nationalism and xenophobia.6(It is difficult, for example, to imagine
foreign sailors continuing to comprise the bulk of America's seamen, as
they did in the nineteenth century.)7 And in the longer term population,
surges and declines do imply changes.in the labor force—granting merely
the useful assumptions that man must earn his daily bread and that a
high level of inertia in human behavior is confidently to be counted upon.
The most challenging aspects of the population-labor force link, however,
are to be found in the study of how changes in population and the labor
force are related to their causes. For such causes encompass the major
social, economic, and political factors atwork in a society.
In the present paper we will consider first some effects of immigration
on U.S. labor force gains over the past century. Second, we shall con-
sider how changing social goals for child and women workers affected the
labor force, and population-labor force relationships.
Immigration and Labor Supply
Birth and death take place without special reference to the labor force
requirements of given geographic areas. The transfer of population from
place to place has therefore long been an integral mechanism in adjusting
labor supply and demand.8
The nature of this transfer is of considerable importance. Folk migra-
tions in historic time have tended to involve entire families. When the
A completely different view appears in Sydney H. Coontz, Population Theories and the
Economic Interpretation,1957,ch.8.Coontz concludes, "In summary, the economic
analysis proceeds on the assumption that population is the dependent variable reflecting
both long- and short-run changes in the demand for labour," p. 183,referringback to
Young, Smith, and Malthus, pp. 88—89.
6Thisgeneralization is less true where such qualifications do not apply—say, for the
regular movement of laborers from Ruanda-Urandi to Kenya,. or Java to Malaya.
Remarks on the Scarcity of American Seamen and the Remedy, by a Gentleman Connected with
the New 1cr/c Press, printed at the Herald Office, New York, 1845, p. i7.ChairmanReed
of the Committee on Naval Affairs is quoted as saying that ioo,ooo of the iog,ooo men
in the Navy and Merchant Marine were foreigners.It is to be doubted that this estimate
was finically precise, but it does at least suggest that a majority were foreigners.
It need not be, of course. Trade alone could fairly well bring the adjustment.
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Marcomanni moved to the uplands of Bohemia, when the Athenians
settled the islands of Asia Minor, a balanced population change and labor
force change occurred: dependents as well as working adults moved.
The key characteristic of migration to the United States in the past
century, however, has been that adults in the prime labor force ages
tended to dominate migration. The labor force increased by a far greater
proportion than did the population.Thus, despite higher birth rates
among the foreign born, less than 7 per cent of this group were under 15
yearsof age in i88o—as compared to 42percent for native whites.9
In addition to the dominance of adults in the migration, there was a
disproportionate tendency for men to migrate even if married. Thus, an
extensive survey by the Immigration Commission as late as 1910reported
that 23 per cent of the married immigrants in their survey had wives
still living in the old country.'°
While this particular pattern tended to reflect the dominance of four
nativity groups (Magyar, Slovak, Italian, and Russian) in the later
migration, males also composed the larger share in the earlier migration
of Irish and Germans, though the latter were mostly unmarried.
The causes of this movement were twofold. The first was a vision of
America as a land, perhaps not of milk and honey, but at least of veal
cutlets and gooseberry pie—at reasonable prices." Where conditions in
Europe were intolerable, the migration push was as critical as the pull.
What converted a dream castle into steerage space and what produced
selective migration of males, was sponsored migration by American firms.
In a labor-scarce country, without limits on immigration, substantial
attempts to attract labor were perhaps to be When heavy,
bunched demands for labor were created by such projects as canal con-
struction, a choice appeared to be posed between bidding up wages to
attract labor from other pursuits—or importing it.12
"Iwish to reduce the price of labor on the Canal to ten dollars per
month of 26 working days.It is now 12and13dollarsa month," wrote
i 88o Census, Statistics of thePopulationof the United States, p. 549. These figures seem
basically inconsistent with the age distribution of immigrants. Reports in this and other
Censuses are consistent, would appear to rest on more reliable procedures than the
pro forma queries of immigration officers on a mere statistical point.
10 U.s. Immigration Commission, Immigration Reports, Part 23, Vol. it, Immigrants in
Industry,p.383. The reports covered t 45,354 immigrants.
Morris Birkbeck, Noteson aJourney in America, Severn and Co., London, i8ig, p. 64,
rolls, biscuits, dry toast, waffles... pickerillsalted... vealcutlets, boiled ham,
gooseberry pie, stewed currants, preserved cranberries, butter and cheese—for all this for
myself and three children" plus fodder forhorses—the charge was "6 shiLlings and
nine pence sterling."
12 In principle productivity gains could moderate the dilemma—and did over the
course of time.
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the President of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company to his
emigration agent.13
The advantages to foreign labor seemed clear enough. "Meat, three
times a day," he wrote to the American Consul in Liverpool, "a plenty
of bread and vegetables, with a reasonable allowance of liquor, and eight,
ten or twelve dollars a month for wages would, we have supposed, prove
a powerful attraction to those who, narrowed down in the circle of their
employments have at this moment, a year of scarcity presented to them."14
And such early recruiting attempts in Dublin, Belfast, and Cork did help
to initiate a stream of migration "beneficial to both England and the
United States."5
When gold was discovered in California, wrote a contemporary,
"workers were dear... andslavery was prohibited. This directed the
attention of moneyed men to the great proletariat of China: they sent
many ships there and imported within a few years 40,000 Chinamen."°
In some instances a highly local situation constituted the incentive for
directed migration. Demands for high wages were made against the
Delaware and Hudson Canal in !832. The Directors found that "Against
this evil the only effectual remedy was the introduction of additional
miners from abroad. This was done as promptly as possible and to such
an extent that itis believed a recurrence of the evil will not be
experienced."7
A cotton plantet in i866, trying to reestablish a Sea Island plantation
and finding the local labor easy and unreliable, reported that "I have sent
to the lonian Islands to get fifteen Greeks at an expense of $2,000 and I
hope they are on their way now."18
Whether the canals of Maryland or Louisiana were involved, or the
plantations of South Carolina or Texas, sponsored migration emphasized
the importation of single males. Time, to some extent, and rising wage
rates for females, tended to correct the resulting imbalance in the sex
ratio.Thus, one writer's tongue-in-cheek comment on the frontier's
"Mercerto Richards, July 8, 1829. C. and 0. Letterbook, U.S. National Archives,
p.84.
14 Mercerto Maury, November 28, 1828. C. and 0. Letterbook, pp.38—39.
16 Mercerto Barbour, November 18, "I will write to Canning directly for it
would be beneficial to both England and the United States to relieve the dominions of the
former of a wretched surplus population."
Janos Zantus, May 5, 1857, writing from San Francisco, quoted in "California for
Hungarian Readers," California Historical Society Quarterly, June, 1949.
Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company
for the year 1832, New York, 1833, p. 35.
18EdwardS. Philbrick in Report of the United States Revenue Commission on Cotton, Special
Report no. 3, Appendix, U.S. Treasury Department, i866.
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shortage of women for housework: "The supply is not equal to the de-
mand as girls who come to Minnesota always have numerous advantage-
ous offers of marriages, some one or more (sic) of which they are generally
sensible enough to accept."19
Specifying the orders of magnitude involved is a difficult matter. We
can, however, see them somewhat darkly through the Census data on the
sex ratio in pioneer states and territories :20















The limitations of such ratios as measures of migrant characteristics are
well known.21 Yet it seems reasonable to infer that men constituted a
disproportionately great share of the migrants who pioneered the mid-
western and southeastern states.
It was not until the railroad building period began that the migration
of single males diminished in relative importance. Beginning perhaps as
early as 1851, when the Erie ran its first emigrant train, the emphasis
changed to importing families who would settle on the railroad lands and
provide a continuing source of traffic.22 This shift meant that the supply
of labor, once provided with a minimum of population increase, now
was associated with greater gains in population as women and children
entered these lands in increasing proportions.
The Immigrants' GuidetoMinnesota in 1856, by an Old Resident, W. W. Wales, St.
Anthony, 1856, p. 67.
20Computedfrom 1820 Population Census, p. i, and 1840 Census, p. 474.
21Cf.the pointed discussion in Dorothy Thomas, Research Memorandum on Migration
during the Depression, Social Science Research Council,
22 FrankAndrew, Railroads and Farming, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Statistics, Bulletin ioo, 1912, pp. 8, i8.
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To this point comments have related primarily to white migration.
What of the major migrant stream from Africa?Several pieces of
evidence suggest a no less substantial tendency for males to predominate
among the nonwhite group. The "uniform practice of dealers in selecting
cargoes of negroes on the African coast, (was) to purchase a considerably
larger proportion of males than females. All witnesses agree on the fact,
though they differ as to the motive."23 Confirmation is suggested by the
practice in supplying other systems of plantation agriculture. According
to an American physician who dealt extensively in slaves prior to 1830
"the proportion of sexes of Africans who are brought to Brazil (is) about
i to io," women being taken only when the captains put i or 2 in a lot
of io and insisted on a sale en bloc.24
The migration pattern afteri 865, of course, was quite different. As
General John A. Wagener of South Carolina wrote in 1867, "South
Carolina has never heretofore taken steps, officially, to induce immigra-
tion because of her peculiar institution of African slavery, which enabled
her inhabitants to prosper and live in patriarchal peace and contented-
ness....Slaveryis now, however, with her own consent, forever
abolished."25 The labor force ceased to meet local demand requirements.
Although the population totals were as high as ever, and although the
South continued to have population exports for many decades, widespread
attempts were made to sponsor labor force replacements. Thus, General
Wagener was made Commissioner of Education for South Carolina about
this time and similar positions were established in other states. The work
of such commissions, however, does not appear to have had any great
impact on either the labor force or population totals.26
The migration process involved in the peopling of the American states
reflected, in sum, concentrated demands for labor, sometimes taking the
form of directed migration. Such demands, in the early decades, were
primarily for labor, not for population. As a result, a disproportionately
great share of all migrants were males in the prime age groups. With
23Reportof the Freedmen's Commission, in U.S. Congress, The War of the Rebellion,
Series 3, Volume 4, p. 324.
24JoseClifford testimony in Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Session January 31—
August 15, 1850, Vol. ix, p. 154..Cliffordstated that he had extensive slave trading
experience until the trade was outlawed in Brazil in 1830.Cf. R. B. Sheridan, "The
Commercial and Financial Organization of the British Slave Trade," Economic History
Review, August, 1958, p. 259, for a similar conclusion based on trade with the West Indies.
26 South Carolina, A Home for the Industrious Immigrant, Charleston, 1867, p. 5.
28 Data in the i88o Census, Population, p. 426, indicates that several southern states
showed declines in the number of foreign born after i86o, most had no significant change,
while Missouri and Texas had significant gains. These gains are readily explicable by
other factors.
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the ending of canal construction, of slavery, and of the opulent oppor-
tunities in Mississippi and Alabama during the flush days, a more settled
type of migration began. The slave coffle and the single horse were
replaced as symbols of movement by the covered wagon, transferring the
and penates of entire households. In recent years, of course, popu-
lation change has been almost solely a matter of working out permutations
in the parent population of native Americans.
Child Labor and Fertility Change
Where is, the man with soul so dead that he interests himself only in the
economic aspects of children? But these are the ones on which the econo-
mist—who is by profession neither bachelor nor married man—can most
usefully comment. It has long been noted by economists that an increase
in the number of children will eventually increase the labor supply and
therefore tend to drive down wages. How many poor law administrators
since Malthus have counseled the working class against the folly of
seeking higher living standards without also limiting philo-progenitiveness.
Yet while an abstract "working class" may suffer, any specific family may
benefit.It must take the labor market 'as it finds it;in past centuries
more children per family have usually meant more income per family.
"Considerations of the economic and social advantages to be derived from
children were once powerful motives in encouraging large families. Of
patriarchal society it was said 'H4ppy is he who has his quiver full of
them';in agricultural communities, especially new ones, the farmer
literally produces his own farm hands."27 The contribution that children
can make in their parents' old age is, of course, a second, highly important
economic factor.28
In a labor-scarce country, such as the United States in the nineteenth
century, the natural desire for children would, to say the least, not run
contrary to what a calculation of their mere economic value would
indicate. In the U.S. today, with fewer farmers than Chicagoans, it is
difficult to credit an i 819reportthat the population of the mid-West was
"so thinly scattered" that "there were but twelve human habitations in
two hundred square miles, and these occupied principally by hunters."29
27 James A. Field, Essays on Population and Other Papers, 1931, pp. 278f.Cf. Isaiah
Bowman, The Pioneer Fringe, 1931, p. 251, on children in other pioneering societies.
Speaking to another way of life, but not a wholly different one, is the finding of a
recent survey of Japan se opinion, in which the proportion of adult males expecting to
depend on their children in their old age was 25% in the major cities and more than
double—57%—in rural areas. Quoted in Horace Beishaw, Population Growth and Levels
of Consumption, 1956, p. 33.
29 John Lorain, Hints to Emigrants, 1819, p. 78.
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But, given these conditions, one writer warned potential immigrants, "no
assistance worthy of notice can be obtained from others outside the
family."30 Under such circumstances a high birth rate was not wholly
unexpected. A late nineteenth century publication of the Department
of Agriculture, noting an 1846 record of "a family of 26 strong healthy
boys," adds that "Today a family of five children is a rarity.This, of
course, affects the amount of help."3'
• When U.S. factories began to proliferate, the economic value of
children became still greater. Cotton factories became a new source of
demand for child labor."It is well known," remarked a writer in 1815,
"that in this country ... children,from their birth until they are of an
age to go into apprenticeship (say 14 or 16) render little service to their
parents; this is more especially the case in towns. But it is this description
of persons who are required in cotton and woolen workers."32
In Rhode Island, where the mills began, 42 per cent of those who
staffed the cotton mills in 1832 were in fact boys under 12. The average
for New England and the country as a whole was about 20 per cent.33
These children provided a substantial supplement to family incOme, being
paid a quarter as much as adult males.34
How the growing demand for labor in the mills may have affected
population growth is not altogether clear. The English Census for 182.1
asserted that the manufacturing population was, in part, increasing
rapidly because, "in many Manufactures, Children are able to maintain
themselves at an early age, and so entail little expense on their Parents,
to the obvious encouragement of marriage."35
However, no similar encouragement is apparent in the United States
with its long-term decline in fertility rates. And a priori one can surmise
that in a labor-scarce country such as the United States at this early
date, children had been sufficiently valuable on farms so that the mere
growth of the manufacturing system would not increase supply. At most,
it would divert population increase to nonfarm pursuits.
30ibid.
31U.S.Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Series, Report no. 4,Wages of
Farm Labor in the United States, 1892.
82 Magazine, October 7, p. g6.
These figures are weighted averages of reports appearing in U.S. Congress Serial
Set 222,223, Documents Relative to the Statistics of Manufactures in the United Slates, 1833,
Duff Green, Washington, Vols. land II. The definition of "boys" as being those under 12
is indicated by the Report of the New York Convention of Friends of the Manufacturing
Interest appearing in Xiles Register, XLII, Addendum, 1832, March—August, p. 7.
Ratio computed from data in Serial Set 222,223.
Quoted by T. H. Marshall in E. M. Carus-Wilson, Essays in Economic History, 1955,
p.330.
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Children were no less valuable under slavery. As a great Southern
architect and engineer noted, "It may indeed be justly considered one of
the excellencies of the cultivation of cotton, that in its collection no
manual labour is lost.Neither age nor childhood, if in health, is pre-
vented from giving its aid in this innocent and useful pursuit. Children
from eight years old can be employed to advantage."36
This "excellency" was not lost sight of on most plantations. Even after
the heavy discounting for future mortality, the sales value of children
was great enough to suggest the nontrivial, value of their labor. About
1820 the average sales value of girls aged 5—10 was set at $175 by the
Maryland Orphans court—or perhaps half the value of an adult male.37
Even in 1865, $400 and more was paid in New Mexico for "a likely girl
of not more than eight years old, healthy and intelligent."38 Considering
how uncertain the continuation of slavery was in 1865, most of the latter
price must have reflected advantages expected to be realized in the very
near future.
Given the distinct contribution that child labor made to the family or
plantation exchequer throughout the nineteenth century, its decline in
the twentieth century hardlSr reflects any inability of the economy to
continue utilizing such labor efficiently.Instead, the change would seem
to stem from concurrent changes in family values and social attitudes.
Was such a factor the ever-increasing level of education? The spread
of free public schools is, of course, a matter of history. From 1850 to 1950
the following rise took place
Children Enrollment in
Tear Aged 5—14 publicschools Ratio
1850 6,132 3,354 55%
1950 24,329 20,242 83%
Some parents had repeated the calculation made by John Stuart Mill, if
not by Horace Mann, of the advantage to the individual of forgoing an
immediate income to assure an eventual higher one.40 Many had been
36RobertMills, Statistics of South Carolina, Huriburt and Lloyd, Charleston, 1826, p. 153. "American HistoricalReview, Vol. 19,1914, p.817.
$8Accordingto Kirby Benedict, Chief Justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court,
quoted in LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, The Old Spanish Trail, 1954,p.280.
The 1850 data are from The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850,1854,pp. xl,
xlii—xliv. They are based on school reports and were used as being more reliable than the
population census count. The.j 950dataare from the i950 Census,Vol. 11,Characteristics
of the Population, Part i,Tables38, ru,andrelate only to those age 5—14.
40 Enteringschool in 1807, Sophia Simpson was unable to pronounce the letter H.
"Do try," said her teacher, "for it will be a thousand pounds in your pocket." Sophia S.
Simpson, Two Hundred Tears Ago, Otis Clapp, Boston, 1859, p. 47.
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moved by other factors. The rise in educational horizons, however, seems
to have had no discernible impact before 1900 in reducing the child labor
force.4'
The decisive factor in reducing the nineteenth century child labor
force was the steady decline in birth rates, from roughly 55 per thousand
population in 1820 to 20 by 1940.42
We can compare the contributionfertility declines and the drop in
the proportion of children working, using data from Table i
TABLE i
Numberof Children Ever Born
(per i,ooowomen, by color)
Mothers' rear
of Bin/i
























































Source. See footnote 45, p. 387.
The number of child workers is estimated simply as the product of the
worker rate and the number of children ever born.44It measures the
4tTheproportion of children working shows no signs of decline in any of the scanty
indications we possess for the nineteenth century. In fact the Census figures for 1870-1900
suggesta possible rise near the end of the period as new mills opened in the South.
Conrad Taeuber and Irene Taeuber, The Changing Population of the United States,
1958, p. 249.
Fertility data from above table. Worker rate data from Alba M. Edwards, Census
of 1940,ComparativeOccupation Statistics for the United States, 1870to1940,p.92.This
assumes, for arithmetic convenience, that the first child is born when the mother is aged 20.
Otherassumptions would make little difference. More important, the 1870 worker rate
seems unreasonably low, the adjustment made by Edwards for the 1870 undercóunt
perhaps being insufficient. The i88orate is therefore used for i870,being more meaning-
ful for a longer view even if the 1870 figure properly reflects the immediate postwar
disturbances. "Becausethe worker rate relates to all children the absolute levels are meaningless
and therefore not shown.
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average number of children, of those born to each group of mothers, that
worked between the ages of 10 and iItsdecline from the first to the
second period derives solely from the fertility worker rates
actually rose. The subsequent drop in child workers from the period
around (mothers born 1865—1869) to the depression years, reflects
primarily the fall in worker rates. For even if the number of children
ever born had not changed, the number of child workers would still have
fallen by 74 per cent—nearly as much as their actual 85 per cent decline.45
indices of
Number of children Child worker rate in Number
Mot hers' year(ever born per ,oooyear 1st child becomesof child
of birth native-white females) ioyears of age workers
1835—n 100.0 100.0 100
1865—69 78.3 108.3 85
1895—99 52.9 28.0 15
From the earliest period of settlement, therefore, children's work made
a significant contribution to our national product. Despite the continued
monetization of such work, however, fertility rates fell over the course of
the entire nineteenth century. Other values than the incomes potentially
provided by their young children became increasingly important to
American families. The proportion of the children sent to work did not
decline until the vague dawn of the twentieth century.Since World
War I it has been the significant decline in child worker rates which
accounts for the diminishing share of children in the labor force. The
fruits of philosophy and of education alike led to a decline in child labor.
Census, Differential Fertility, 1940and1910:Womenby Number of Children Ever
Born, Table iii.Thisreport gives differing figures from the 1940 and from the 1910CCflSUS
on the number of children born to the same groups of women. The causes of these differ-
ences are discussed lucidly in Taeuber and Taeuber, op. cit., p.
Themethod of adjusting the Census data used here was as follows: In the igio Census,
3,128 women born in 1865—1874 reported an average of 3.769 children;in the '940
Census,1,771womenborn in the same period reported an average of children.
The two averages would be quite consistent if we could assume that 2,357women(3,128
minus 1,771)haddied by the latter date and had had an average of 4.030children.
• Neither assumption seems grossly unreasonable. The 6.35% excess between the 1910
andi940 reportswould then be taken to reflect the steady toll of selective female mortality,
and assumed to have developed at a steady rate. The contemporary report was
therefore taken as standard, the rate of excess interpolated for the group born in 1865—
1874 through the 1895—1899 group.
A parallel mortality bias would of course have appeared in the i910 reports.Lacking
a better measure, the same 6.35% excess was applied to the 1835—1844 group (which
stands in the same relation to the zgio Census as the 1865—1874 one does to the 1940),
withinterpolation to give the excess for the other years. This implicitly assumes a stable
trend in selective mortality.
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Women in the Labor Force
The link between population and labor force change is most evident when
the role of women is studied, for women constitute part of this genera-
tion's population and labor force and produce the next generation of
each. Relatively little information, unfortunately, is available on women's
work when their work in factory and store was uncommon. This probably
reflects the basic convention of our society (like most nonmatriarchal
ones) that women do not work unless they work outside the home. Thus,
the i 820 Census schedules, taken in the days of John Adams and John
Randolph, report virtually no women in the labor force, although a large
number undoubtedly did farm chores, worked in domestic service, and
the like.
No factor changed the composition of the female labor force more than
did the introduction of the cotton gin and the cotton mill. Let us review
the longer term development, first for white and then for nonwhite
females.
White females. After the recession of 1819, jobS under factory discipline
opened up in the new centers of Great Falls, Waltham, York, and Lowell.
Offering incomes larger than the imputed value of work on the family
farm,4° and usually paying in .cash, the new factory system transformed
existing labor force patterns for women.47 By 1831, one of the founding
fathers of Lowell could pridefully note that "No less than thirty-nine
thousand females find employment in the cotton factories of the United
States."Yet before "the establishment of these and other domestic
manufactures this labor was almost without employment." His inference?
Daughters are 110w emphatically a blessing to the farmer. Many instances
have come within the personal knowledge of individuals of this committee, in
which the earnings of daughters have been scrupulously hoarded to enable them
to pay off mortgages on the paternal farm.48
In addition to freeing the paternal homestead, daughters working in
textile mills undoubtedly also provided their own dowries (as they do
today in Japan)—thus linking labor force increase to subsequent popula-
tion change.
"Onemay set the imputed value of farm female labor at something near the Si a
week then paid to domestic servants.
This shift may have involved only a slight increase in hours worked by the male
labor force. A recent study of industrialization in a rural county found that a new factory
drew female workers mostly from marginal farms, with little change in farm labor inputs.
Cf. Paul H. Price a ci., The Effects of Industrialization on Rural Louisiana, January,1958,
Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station and U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Table 13,p.42.
P. T. Jackson in Journal of theProceedingsof the Friends of Domestic Industry, Baltimore,
1831, p.iii.
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It would be helpful in contemplating this interesting course of con-
sequences if we could get a bearing on the extent to which women did
enter the labor force as the factory system developed and urbanization
spread. The figures in Table 2 are an attempt to provide this, indicating
the change over two sixty-year periods.
TABLE 2
WorkingWomen: 1830—1957
Worker Rates by Marital Status, Color, and Age
Tear
Alt Ages Age 35—44
White Nonwhite Native WhiteNonwhite
TotalSingleMarriedTotal Single Married Single Married Single Married
183oa (8) — —(so)(90)(90) — (ga)




1951 CPSC 31.550.524.341.141.336.0— —— —
1957 CPS 33.948.028.742.537.940.2—— — —
a See Appendix A.
bDuranddata for whites relate to native white.
Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.
A variety of problems in definition and measurement besets the com-
parison of data from such different sources.49 But reasonable adjustments
for them would not change the key inference from the table: the gain
between x 830 and i890was small as compared with that between i890
and 1950.It is clearly impossible to measure each of the separate factors
at work in creating this difference—the move to the city, the changing
tide of immigration, the varying marriage and birth rates, and soon.
But a summary reckoning would suggest that the dominant factorwas
almost certainly the changing pattern of work for women. For thepro-
portion working rose sharply as time went on, even apart from changes
in the age, nativity, marital status, rurality composition of thegroup.
For the period since 1890 the proof is reasonably clear. A study by
Wolfbein and Jaffe of the 189o—193o changes shows that shifts in the
distribution of the female population as between various demographic
Many of these are canvassed in Durand's basic study. Since the time that was pub-
lished, further incomparabilities have occurred even within the Current Population
vey reporting. Adjustments in the 1890 data to make them comparable with the 1940
Censuslabor force concept have not been adopted because it is not clear whether the
result would be more comparable with the actual 1950Censusfigures. However, only
0.2pointsare involved in Durand's adjustment.
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categories (sex, color, nativity, marital status) made a trivial contribution
to the great gains in female worker rates over these four decades.5° A
more precise review made by Durand of our 1920—1940 experience
ingeniously measures the contribution of each factor to worker rate
changes, including the farm-nonfarm move.5' His conclusions on this
point are similar.
It should be particularly noted that the '950 rates, high as these are,
tell us only of labor force participation at a point in time. The proportion
of women who work at some time during the year is far greater. For
1956 we have the following data which, though relating to both white
and nonwhite married females, may fairly be taken as demonstrating for





Per cent in the labor force 17.0 36.0
Percent working in 1956 30.7 46.2
Survey of Consumer Finances
Per cent employed in 1956 27.5 32.7
The Census data report a very substantial margin of part-year employ-
ment—both for women with young children and those without.(The
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that appear to contradict
this point for those without young children are not wholly comparable.
And unfortunately any of the variations in definition and enumerative
approach that come to mind as explanations for these Census-SCF
differences are too convincing: they explain equally well differences for
women with young children—a group for which differences do not
exist!)53
5° S. L. Wolf bein and A. J. Jaffe, "Demographic Factors in Labor Force Growth,"
American Sociological Review, August, 1946.
61 Durand, op. cit., ch.Tableio and passim.
Census: Current Population Reports, Series P-5o, no. 8i, Family Characteristics of
Working Wives:March 1957,Tables9, io• and unpublished Census data.Survey of
Consumer Finances: unpublished data kiadly provided by Professor James Morgan
from Study 650, Economic Behavior Progi am, relative to the i 957 Survey of Consumer
Finances. Comparisons were made for i 955 (using Census reports P-5o, flOS. 62 and 73,
and unpublished SCF data), which show similar, but less extreme, differences.
53 These results are particularly puzzling since no reference, say, to differences in
interviewing approach, seems to explain (a) the essentially same results for women with
young children, and (b)thestriking difference for those without young children. James
N. Morgan notes in a private communication that "question sequences in the SCF are
directed toward more complete income reports rather than employment detail," and
that reports on employment status are "highly sensitive to the question asked."
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In summary, while worker rates for white females rose markedly during
the nineteenth century, their gain 190o—195oappearsto have been con-
siderably greater. The rise during a long period of national growth and
expansion was nowhere nearly equal to that during the latter decades.
One factor may have been the supply of slave labor, a topic to which
we now turn.
Nonwhite females. The system of slavery, which had been faltering in
the tobacco and hemp fields, took on renewed strength with the spread
of the cotton gin.Female Negroes began to be used throughout the
South in substantial numbers not merely as domestics but as field hands.
It would appear that as early as 182o the proportion of female slaves in
the labor force was probably as great as that of males.
The broad sweep that appears if the suggested orders of magnitude
(from the Appendix) are correct is shown in the following table:
Per Cent of Nonwhite Females in the Labor Force54
All Nonwhites '4 and over Age 35—44
Tear TotalSingleMarried SingleMarried
Estimated 1830 (90) (90) (go)
1890 37.7 52.5 21.9 75.6 21.5
1950 37.! 36.! 31.8 65.8 38.7
Surely the enormous decline over the sixty-year span beginning in 1830
is the most striking aspect of this table.It is even more striking if we
assume, as seems not unreasonable, a precipitous fall between i86o and
1865. The substance of the decline appears to have been a fall in rates
for married women: the rates for single women changed much more
moderately. Nearly a century has passed since that time but the over-all
rate in 1950appearsto be much as it was in 1865. Mild declines in the
rate for single women, and mild changes in the ratio of single to married
women offset the moderate rise in rates for married women.
Population-Labor Force Trends
Given this pattern of change in worker rates for women in the century
and a quarter between the days of the first Lowell operatives and the
" figures for the 35—44 age group estimated, given the review noted in the text
of Census data, at 95%—or a rate similar to that reported for males in this age group
in any Census providing such data—i.e., from 1850on.For the io and over category, an
arbitrary reduction is made to allow for the aged and sick who, on the average, did not
work ihouror more a week.i8go:derived from data in John Durand, The Labor Force
in the United States, 1890—1960, 1948, pp. 2i6f.I950: 1950 Census,Employment and Personal
Characteristics, Table II.
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women who assemble missile components, what can we say of some of the
associated population changes?
In part, the far greater 189o—195o rise in female worker rates than the
1830—1890 rise was produced by the changing demographic composition
of the population. A still more significant force, however, must have
been the falling immigration tide.Kuznets and Rubin have pointed
out that nearly a fifth of the population gain in the decades from i 860
to i8go consisted of immigrants, and about the same proportion for the
labor force, with the figures dwindling rapidly in subsequent decades.55
But immigrants competed disproportionately in the low wage markets
where women were actual and potential employees.Especially after
1920, therefore, when immigration was drastically cut, demand shifted
and an increasing proportion of women were hired.
Turning to another facet of this change, how did changing fertility
rates (with their impact on the population totals) affect worker rates for
females, and vice versa? To speculate on possible answers to this question,
we require first a measure of fertility trends. For whites, the Census data
on the number of children under 5 provide us with rough but useful
indications for i 85off.56
The level of nonwhite fertility prior to 1850, however, is a highly
uncertain matter. Under conditions of slavery, a high fertility rate was
a desideratum to be commended and encouraged. Testimony on this
point ranges from the horrified specificity of Mrs. Kemble to the consoling
skepticism of Ulrich Phillips. Both imply such a conclusion.57
Many leading Southern analysts concluded, in the words of General
Jubal Early, that a "rapid multiplication of the slaves by natural increase"
took place; whereas "premature emancipation" (in the words of the
Reverend Robert L. Dabney) was "leading to ultimate extermination" as
fertility rates fell.58
Simon Kuznets and Ernest Rubin, Immigration and the Foreign Born, 1954,p.45.
The valuable discussion on pp. deals generally with the contribution of immigration
to the population and labor force increase.
Summarized in Taeuber and Taeuber, op. cii., p. 25.
Cf. William Gilmore Simms, The Geography of South Carolina, Babcock and Co.,
Charleston, 7843, p. 2 z: "The slaves are very prolific, increasing in greater proportion
than the whites; a sufficient proof of the mildness of their servitude and labor."
68JubalE. Early, The Heritage of the South, '9i5, pp. 113—114. The full quotation
reads: "Let anyone compare the condition of the African in his native land with the
slaves of the South before the violent abolition of slavery, and then say whether that
institution, which had produced such a vast improvement in his condition was so great a
wrong after all.The most conclusive answer to the slanders against Southern slave
owners is to be found in the rapid multiplication of the slaves by natural increase, which
cDuld not have taken place if such barbarities had been practiced or such immorality
had existed as has been represented." Robert L. Dabney, D.D., in A Defence of Virginia,
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"As a factor in the increase of population" the Negro "must of necessity
decline in ratio to the whole" concluded the Commissioner of Agriculture
for Georgia, in his discussion of postwar labor supply.59
But did a high absolute birth rate result among nonwhites before i86 t
—a higher one, say, than for whites? These various pressures may only
have kept the nonwhite rate above the level it would have otherwise
reached.Indeed, both the 1850 and i86o Census results suggests that
fertility was approximately the same among whites and nonwhites in the
South, whatever the basic fecundity trends.6°
More striking still is the rise in the proportion of children that took
place among the nonwhite population from i86o to i88o. The 1900
Census report—presumably prepared by Walter Wilicox—suggested that
"a greatly increased birth rate... wasone of the first results of emanci-
pation.If that be admitted, the parallel between the emancipated
Negroes in the South, and the emancipated serfs in Russia, the rate of
increase among whom since emancipation has been extraordinary, is a
striking
Putting these elements together, we may deduce that a variety of
factors led to Negro family limitation under slavery. Such factors should
have been somewhat more important in 1830 than 1850, given the
increased volume of transfers from the breeding states to Missouri, Texas,
and the Gulf States. On the other hand, a much greater proportion of
the 1830 female slave population had been transported from Africa than
of the 1850 population. Setting one factor off against the other, we return
to the simpler hypothesis—namely, that the level of nonwhite fertility
under slavery was much the same in i 830 as in i 850 and i 86o. We will
and through Her, of the Southin Recentand Pending Contests against the Sectional Party, 1867,
p. 90, wrote of changes 1865—1867 in Virginia: ".-factsalready evince the of
ultimate extermination which Southern Philanthropists have ever predicted as the result
of premature emancipation is already overtaking the negro with giant strides...the
population of blacks in i86o being 531,000" reduced by 1867 to "340,500." Dabney
was no casual observer but had been ecclesiastical professor of history and polity and
systematic and polemic theology at a leading seminary, as well as adjutant general to
Stonewall Jackson.
59 Thomas P. Jones, Commissioner of Agriculture for the State of Georgia, Handbook
of the State of Georgia, 1876, p. 152. "The future of the Negro in America -.-asan
element in politics, his career is virtually at an end. As a factor in the increase of popula-
tion, his race must of necessity decline in ratio, to the whole..."
1900 Census, Supplementary Analysis, p. 418, shows for 1850, 695 white and 705
nonwhite children under 5 years of age per r,ooo females 15—49. For i86o, the rates were
682 and 688, respectively.
61 ibid., p. 417. To get over the difficulty of the 1870 undercount, one may simply
look to the i 86o— I 88o change, which was a slight decline for southern whites, a substantial
increase for southern nonwhites, p. 418.
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therefore assume that the average of the rates reported by the Census for
1850 and i 86o applied equally well in 1830(Table 62
TABLE3




1830 est. 1,145 988k .
l85oest. 892 1,010 .
i86o est. 905 965

















1890-1950.Taeuber and Taeuber, op.cit.
Population-Labor Force Relationships
Given this background of worker rate and fertility change, what conchi-
sions can we draw from the data summarized below:
Native-White Women Nonwhite Women
Number of children Number of children
under 5 years of age under 5 years of age
rearWorker rate perioowomen 20—44Workerrate per ioo women 20—44
1830 8 "4 90 99
i8go 13.3 6g 37.7 93
1950 28.1 59 37.' 7'
Itwould be hard to find a set of figures that shows less of a simple
relationship between long-run trends in worker rates and in fertility.
62Thesefigures differ from the adjusted estimates shown in Taeuber and Taeuber,
p. 251,fornonwhites. The latter writers assume a i understatement in reported
Census totals for 185o and i86o—thc percentage found in a study covering 1925—1930.
Itis here assumed, however, that the true percentage for these particular years would be
the same 5% as that used by Taeuber and Taeuber for whites.Because of the great
monetary importance of slaves, there is no reason to believe that the underenumeration
among nonwhites was greater than among whites.Reporting by planters for their
slaves may in fact have produced more precise figures than did the endeavors of Census
enumerators to find marginal white Therefore we have no basis forassuming
differential underenumeration rates for the slave period.
The 1830 figure was estimated as the average of the iand t86ofigures as revised on
this 5% basis.
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For native whites, the worker-rate rise over the first sixtyyearswas far
less than over the second—but the fertility-rate fall over the first period
was enormously greater than over the second.For nonwhites, the
contrast is even more extreme. Worker rates fell precipitously over the
first period,, not at all over the second;fertility fell only slightly over
the first period but largely over the second.
A decline in fertility must surely facilitate a rise in worker rates, yet
the overriding impact of factors other, than fertility change was clearly
much greater. One would hardly conclude from such data that major
changes in fertility are sufficient, or even necessary, conditions for major
changes in worker rates. The data, of course, are chancy, and they are•
limited to particular Census years. Yet reasonable shifts of the worker
rates, or shifts in our reference dates to a Census ten years earlier or later,
would make little difference in this basic conclusion. Social and economic
factors other than fertility change must have dominated the change in
the female labor force.
Let us now go on to the period since• 1890, for which the Census data
and the basic study by John Durand make possible a review of such vital
TABLE 4
Female Labor Force and Fertility Trends: Changes 1890—1940






























































































. 65+ —2,322 —22.9 — 3.7 +19.2
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factors as the changing age and marital composition of the female popu-
lation. Data for the 1890—1940 change are presented in Table4.Here.
we are concentrating not on the data for the entire female group—nor
even for the married group per se. Now it is obvious that nativity change,
migration, urbanization, and so on, all affected worker rates. How can
we adjust for their influence in trying to measure the relationship between
changing fertility and changing worker rates?
One method of approximate allowance is to assume that the changes
in worker rates for single women will measure the changes—age for age
—that would have occurred for married women apart from the factors
associated with their marital statusFor measuring these influences we
therefore consider single women to be an enormous sample of the popula-
tion. The sample may well have some biases for this measurement. But
its great size, and lack of any obvious important bias, make it worthy of
consideration. We therefore take the differential between the worker
rates for single and married women as measuring the factors associated
with marriage.
WHITE: the worker rates for married women gained less than did those
for single women. Despite sharp declines in fertility—measured either
in terms of number of children in the Census year or long-term cohort
fertility—worker rates for this group didgain relatively.
NONWHITE: the opposite pattern appears—fertility falling substantially
and worker rates'rising substantially.
What seems to be at work in producing these contrasting responses?
An analytic tradition reaching to Maithus and beyond makes children
and material acquisitions alternative goods: "we are familiar with the
notion that a man's standard of living is defined by the wants he insists
upon satisfying before he is willing to enlarge his family."63 We might,
therefore, emphasize how the decline in fertility facilitated the rise in
worker rates,thereby providing a basisfor increased income and
acquisition.
But while some such interactions undoubtedly occurred, they are no
very simple ones. Had a single-minded preference for income been the
major force at work, it would have been simpler to satisfy such a preference
in the traditional manner by sending children to work early and often.
We can more plausibly link the decline in fertility to a conscious
03J•A. Field, op. cit., p. 231.ForMaithus, as for others, "hope of bettering one's
conditions was the great inducement from which restriction of numbers was to "result,"
p. 54.Field quotes Ely's Principles, 1893: "The number and character of the wants
which a man considers more important than marriage and family constitute his 'standard
of living,'" p. 389.
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attempt to reduce the dangers and burdens of childbearing, to a desire
to achieve greater comfort for mothers and greater well-being for children.
As men increasingly achieved a shorter work day it was only to be
expected that women too would seek equal rights.The hope might
reasonably be entertained that both halves of the old jingle—"Man's
work is from sun to sun; women's work is never done' '—were becoming
obsolete.
But given the shortened period of childbearing and responsibility that
followed upon fertility declines, the time thus freed was utilized quite
differently by each group.Nonwhite married women increased their
worker rates more than single women; the white group did not (Table 4)
and by 1940 substantially more nonwhite than white women of the prime
ages and in detailed categories were in the labor force (Table
TABLE5
Proportion of Married Women Aged 35—44
in the Labor Force:i940
Family Income
$ 600—8999 All Incomes
Without With Without With
Area Childrenunder ioChildrenunder io
Metropolitan areas
Total 29.6 12.0 21.8 8.o
Nonwhite 36.5 21.5 38.2 20.1
Urban places
25,000—100,000
Total 34.3 15.9 24.9 11.0
Nonwhite 54.0 — 52.1 39.8
Urban places
2,500—25,000
Total 31.6 15.0 24.4 11.5
Nonwhite 44.9 29.1 50.0 37.8
Rural nonfarm
Total 21.2 8.8 18.9 8.6
Nonwhite 23.0 16.4 33.2 22.8
Rural farm
Total — — 7.5 4.2
Nonwhite — — 13.2
U.S.
Total — — '9.7 7.5
Nonwhite — — 34.5 19.4
1940 Census,Employment and Family Characteristics of Women, Table 23.Unfortunately
statistical progress has not provided data for later years.
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The plantation heritage was surely a major factor in producing this.
differential. What about the income insurance that a second earner
provided—surely no mean consideration in a group that appears dis-
proportionately in those industries and occupations that are hit first by
unemployment?65 The influence of low and unstable income, however,
was surely at work among the foreign born too—employed as they were
in domestic service, in basement cigar factories or rag picking, in piece-
work at home, or in sweat shops. Yet the trend for foreign-born whites
largely paralleled that for native whites. They adopted American stan-
dards of family size despite the high fertility traditions in which most of
them were raised. And they followed prevailing American standards as
to the propriety and desirability of women working outside the home;
despite low and unstable incomes they did not adopt worker rates similar
to those of the nonwhite group.
If we combine all the color and nativity groups (taking each of the
age-nativity-color groups with complete or near-complete fertility shown
in Table 4 as an independent observation) and charç worker rate change
against fertility change, a broad pattern of relationship can be seen.66
Within the nonwhite group there seems to be a clear inverse relation-
ship—the greater the decline in fertility, the greater the relative rise in
worker rates.There is clearly no relationship within the foreign-born
group. There may be one for native whites. But when all are considered
together a moderately high correlation appears. This correlation reflects,
it is believed, a tendency for gross differences in fertility levels to diminish
as a national pattern developed. Greater than proportionate decreases
in the initially high rates for Negroes, smaller ones for whites, brought the
two sets of rates together.Over, the 1830—1940 period differentials
between native, foreign-born, and nonwhite worker rates and fertility
rates diminished.The deèline in fertilityrates, while undoubtedly
facilitating a rise in worker rates, hardly seems to have produced any such
rise. For major portions of the female population, worker rates actually
fell;for others the change bore no reasonable proportion to the change
in fertility rates.
Theinverse relationship between income of husband and worker rate for wife is
discussed at length in Clarence D. Long, The Labor Force under Changing Income and Employ-
ment, published for the National Bureau of Economic Research by Princeton University
Press, 1958. Cf. also Paul Douglas, The Theory of Wages, 1934,ch.xx and Nedra Belloc,
"Labor-Force Participation and Employment Opportunities for Women" in Journal of
the American Statistical Association, September, 1950,especiallyp. 405.
66 Ratesfor the under 35 group are ignored. The "number of children ever born" is
an inadequate measure of completed fertility for the younger age groups, while the number
of children under 5 is a shorter term measure, grossly affected by short term variations in
econOmic activity and other elements.
398POPULATION CHANGE AND SUPPLT OF LABOR
Our experience since 1940 is a striking supplement.I have referred
above to "the" American standard of living. But that standard refused
to stay still—and the income goal for all Americans rose at an accelerated
pace as prices jumped and a multitude of new jobs opened. Not 'only
were opportunities for women's work increasing at a great rate—but they
were taken up. Thus, the proportion of women with young children
who worked nearly tripled from 1940 to 1957 (Table 6).67 Not only did
TABLE 6
Working Wives, 1940—1957
(percent' in labor force by age and by presence of young children)
Under 65 18-24 25—34 35—44 45—64
U.S. WHITE ANDNONWHITE






































1954 14.9 — — — —
1957 17.0 — — — —
U.S. NONWHITE

















1957 50.7 — — —
















1957 24.0 — — —
1940; computedfrom i940 Census,Employment and Family Characteristics of Women,
Tables 4 andTheoverall total relates to women 18—64. Durand, op. cit., p. 207,gives
adjustment factors to make the 1940Censusdata comparable with the CPS data for
i945ff. These suggest that limited increases in the estimates shown above are necessary
for strict comparability with more recent data.
1950:1950 Census,General Characteristics of Families, Tables i2 andi
1954:CurrentPopulation Reports, no. 62, Marital and Family Characteristics qf the
Labor Force in the United States, April. 1955and'954, Table 3, p. 50.Thissource reports
data for married women of all ages. These were adjusted to apply to those under 65 by
the difference between these groups that can be computed from the 1950data.For those
with children under 6, no adjustment is required. For those without children under 6,
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worker rates increase when the responsibilities of child rearing declined;
they rose even when such responsibilities increased.
The rise in second and third births would certainly have tended to keep
women with children under 6 from working. The rise in first births
would have tended to reduce the over-all worker rate for newly-married
women. The sharp decline in domestic servants since the war, also the
shift in population to the suburbs (to houses from apartments), would
also have exercised a restraining effect.
What appear to be the major factors that offset these forces and made
worker rates for females rise more, and faster, than ever before in our
history? A minor contribution was certainly made by the move from
farm to city.68 Another small factor was the change in composition of
the female population.69 But the major factors lie elsewhere—two on the
supply side, and two on the demand.
(i) On the supply side the major incentive is to be found in the dazzling
array of material goods now incorporated into the American standard of
living. Some may define this as the means to an easier life;others, as
the desire to keep up with the Joneses (as they keep up with the Smiths);
still others, as the crass materialism characteristic of the postwar Byzantine
periods in world history. But however such interpretations are decided,
the result is the same. In recent years in the United States, the consumer
in "consumer durables" has proved to be the working wife.7°
A recent study, made for quite different purposes, throws a brilliant
light on one side of this problem. If we look at Table 7, we see a clear
tendency at each income level for a greater proportion of families with
working wives to have debts than families with only the husband
working.7'(Rosett's study, using 1952 Survey of Consumer Finances
the 1950 data showed 25.3 for allages and27.5 for under 64, and a 36.1 to 37.8 contrast
for nonwhites. These absolute differences in 1950 were assumed to apply in 1954 as well.
1957: Current Population Reports, P-5o, no. 8 i, Family Characteristics of Working Wives,
March, 1957, Table 9, and unpublished Census data. The reported all-age data were
adjusted to under-65 levels by the same procedure as used above for 1954.
68 For the 1920—1940 period this contribution was minor for the over-3o year group,
significant for the 20—24 group. Cf.John Durand, "Married Women in the Labor Force,"
American Journalof Sociology, November,1946, pp. 220—221.
69Butnot much. A trivial increase in the proportion of nonwhite females to total i
and over works in the opposite direction.
70Itdoes not, of course, have to follow that these causes and consequences were
without parallel in other countries. The rising worker rate for women, especially married
women, in other countries is discussed in UN, Determinants,p.2001. and in Long's forth-
coming monograph.
71 These data are based on a supplement to the Census Bureau's Current Population
Survey for August, 1956, and appear in Federal Reserve Board, Consumer instalment
Credit, Part t, Vol. 2, Growth and Import, 1957, Table D-i.
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TABLE
Families with Debts as a Per Cent of all
Families (1956) Excess
With Husband With Wife and
Only WorkingHusband Working(2) — (i)
Family Income (I) (2)
Under $3,000 57 65 +8
$3,000—$4,999 71 72 +1
85,000—87,499 74 78 +4
$7,500andover 67 74 +7
data, suggests the same conclusion.72) The excess for the families with
working wives would be still greater if we classified the families by their
husband's income alone—as is essentially done in the above table for
the other families.(For families with working wives almost by definition
have come from lower levels of income if classified by husbands' income.)
In summary, families with working wives not merely have higher
incomes but more commonly acquire debts, despite, or because of; the
wife's work. It is doubtful, on the latter alternative, whether it is possible
to know, or particularly useful to assert, the priority of the chicken or the
egg. Work by the wife and the incurring of debts are interrelated means
to the prompt acquisition of consumer durables.
We can proceed a bit further by examining the type of debt involved
(Table 8).A priori one might not expect any. significant differences by
type of debt, but the figures do in fact show sharp contrasts.Families
with working wives, far more than those without, go into debt for cars
and household equipment—at every income level. This excess does not
appear where mortgage debt and car debt are both present. And where
only mortgages are involved, or mortgages and household equipment
debt, the pattern is actually reversed.74 A steadily widening gap appears
in Table 8 between families with working wives and those without, as
one prpceeds across from the figures for auto purchase, through auto
purchase in combination with houses, to data for house purchase.
Today's wife will enter the labor force to work for a car, washing
machine, a refrigerator. Such durable items can be delivered at once,
Econometrica, March, 1958, p. 326.
"FederalReserve Board, Consumer Instalment Credit..., p.237f.Ithas been assumed
that the husband worked both in those families reporting one paid worker and in those
where 2ormore workers were reported, one being the wife.
In explaining this contrast one must make due allowance for the role of FHA
regulations, and the stipulations of the capital market, as not counting the income of the
wife as a sufficiently solid source for buttressing mortgage loans. This element, however,
does not preclude the wife's working.
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TABLE 8






All Household Mortgages Household
Income DebtorsEquipment and Cars Equipment
Under $3,000
Husbandworking 100 20 2 26
Wife and husband working 100 23 2 19
+3 0 —7
$3,000—$4,999
Husband working 100 21 7 39
Wife and husband working 100 24 7 34
+3 0 —5
$5,000—$7,499
Husband working 14 12 49
Wife and husband working ioo 23 10 36
+9 —2 —13
$7,500 andover
Husband working 100 I I 15 58
Wife and husband working 100 i 8 I2 47
+7 —3 —II
andtitle acquired within a finite time. They require only temporary
labor force participation by the wife.75 The purchase of a home, on the
other hand, is a long-range affair.Its final acquisition is necessarily
obscured in the indefinite future.76 A further influence that one might
assume to be at work in producing this result is the tendency for house
acquisition to operate as a surrogate variable for the presence of young
Cf. Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Instalment Credit ..., p.i86, in which Murray
Wernick states ".. boththe increased seeking of employment by married women and
the incurrence of debt may be influenced by the desire for the ownership of additional
durable goods." The "very high incidence of credit use and indebtedness among families
in which the head is employed and the wife is unemployedand looking for work" suggest
that "financial pressures are a factor influencing the wife to enter and remain in the labor
market, when empLoyment opportunities and incomes are at high levels."
Morgan's comment on spurious correlation is not a contradiction of this point but
an apexegesis. He does not disagree with the point that at every family income level
today's wife is more likely to enter the labor force to help purchase a car or other durable
than to help buy a house. He is asking whether this is equally true within given age and
parity groups. The implication that young married women without children must per se
prefer to buy durables rather than houses does not follow, of course, and need not. But
the point is an interesting one and it is to be hoped that the Survey of Consumer
will enlighten us on this point in future surveys. Since income advances with age, Table 7
gives us a crude indication that at higher ages there is no growing inclination to work for
mortgage payments rather than cars and other durables. If anything, the reverse may be
indicated by the table.
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children. However, the over-all relationship between age and mortgage
debt is not negative, as it shQuld be to make this factor real and
substantial.
(2)Asecond factor in getting more women to enter the work force
has been the reduction in family income receipt from once cuitomary
sources, such as, as already noted, the decline in working children, and
such as the decline in family income from boarders and lodgers—for
urban families a source once second only to earnings by the family head
(see Table g).78
TABLE9
Proportion of Urban Families
With Lodgers
With Income
fromLodgers . NativeForeign All
rear White Born Familiesor Boarders
1901 — — — 23
1910 10.0 32.9 (17.6) —
1930 9.0 10.2 g.8 —
1941 — — — 12
1950 — — (5.0) 8
On the demand side, where the increasing opportunities for work by
women appear, two factors may be briefly mentioned. One is particularly
associated with the rise in female worker rates that followed after the
"Theproportion with mortgage debt rises steadily with age. The proportion with
mortgage debt alone or in combination with household equipment or miscellaneous
debt also shows a tendency to rise with age. FRB, Consumer Instalment Credit..., p.236.
Most important, for present purposes, no decline with age is apparent for mortgage debt.
781901:Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1903,1904,p. 363.
1910:U.S.Immigration Commission, Reports, Part 23, 1,1911,Vol.19,p.128. The
Commission only reports rates for native white and for foreign-born white. The Negro
rate was assumed as equal to the foreign born. All three were then weighted together by
the number of married males in each nativity-color group. 1910Census,Population, p. 522.
Thenumber of married males was equal to 90%of thenumber of families, ibid., p. 1285.
1930:CensusofPopulation,Families, Vol. vi, p. 24. -
1941:Bureau of LaborStatistics Bulletin no. 822, Family Spending and Saving in Wartime,
1945,pp.33, 95.
,950:Census of Housing, XonfarmHousing Characteristics, Vol. ii,Parti,TableA- 10.
Of35.9 million occupied dwelling units 2.2.hadnonrelatives living in the household.
This ratio of about 6% was reduced to 5% to allow for servants living in.
1950:BLS-WhartonSchool of Finance and Commerce, Study of Consumer Expenditures
Incomes and Savings, 1956, XI,p.4.
Data in the 1901reporton the proportion with lodgers—running to about 2%for
natives and for foreign born—were ignored as unreasonably low. They must reflect a
confusion in reporting between lodgers and boarders and/or the special characteristics
of the sample.It is suggestive that one-third of the reporting families paid union dues
(including one-half of the sample families from Pennsylvania). ibid., p. 501.
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closing off of immigration—namely, the significant gap between pre-
vailing male and female wages. A second, of slight importance during
World War I and of major importance during World War II, was the
removal of a large share of the experienced labor force at the time that
increased demands for production were being. made. The combination
brought dramatic changes in the tables of organization traditional in
many industries, and increased the opportunities for female employment.
In sum, the very substantial 1830—1865, and 189o—195o rises in the
proportion of women in the labor force may be attributed to a variety
of supply and demand factors, few of which are closely associated with
population changes.Fertility declines helped make it possible for an
increasing number of women to work. But they were hardly essential:
in some periods the trend was actually opposite to what an a priori
analysis might have indicated. And conversely, while the increasing
participation of women in the labor force may have limited birth rates
over "what they would have been otherwise," the rapid rise in birth rates
since 1940 suggests that it did not produce any absolute decline in rates.
Convergence
The outstanding development in the United States labor force—population
relationships over the past century has been that of convergence: differ-
entials between social groups, nativity groups, and regions have tended
to diminish and (in some instances) to dwindle away. Fertility rates have
risen for certain groups while for others they have plummeted. Worker
rates have stayed rigidly fixed at levels established many years ago for
some categories, and have shifted rapidly for others. The one uniformity
at work throughout these phenomena is that the spread between the rates
for the different social, age, and nativity groups tended to diminish.
This tendency is related to the economist's equalizing of marginal factor
returns, to the anthropologist's acculturation, to the statistician's regres-
sion to the mean. But it is not quite the same as any of these. The process
is dynamic, the goal is perpetually in motion, and noneconomic factors,
as well as economic advantage, are being maximized. Let us consider
some instances of such convergence.
In Table 2 we can review the trend of United States worker rates
for females over a century and a quarter.Because of obvious
data estimated as outlined in text above.1890, 1940;Durand,op. cit.,
pp. 49, 216—217. These Census data have been made as comparable as possible by
Durand. The data used relate to native whites and to nonwhites, to single and to married
women. 1940,1950: 1950Census, Employment and Personal Characteristics, Table ii.The
data relate to all whites, to nonwhites; to married women, spouse pr.esent, and to single
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incomparabilities in the data over time,8° the table is set up to permit
rough generalizations with respect to change over overlapping periods.
What, then, do these data indicate on the convergence of worker rates?
First, white-nonwhite comparisons. The nonwhite rate was i6times as
great as the white rate when the Napoleonic wars closed.It was only 3
times as great by i8go; not quite twice as much in 194o; and only half
again as great by i957. The nonwhite rate for married women in i8go
was zo times that for whites. By 1940itwas less than 3 times as great.
Over the same period the nonwhite rate for single women fell from a rate
nearly double the whjte rate to one virtually the same.
Since i940, whiteand nonwhite married women's rates have further
converged, but rates for nonwhite single women have decreased, producing
divergence rather than convergence for this group.8'
Second, we can look at the contrast between the rates for single and
married women. The proportion of unmarried white women working,
in ratio to married white women, in 1890 was 14timesas great; in 1940
wasless than 4 times as great; in 1957 was less than twice as great. For
nonwhite women the ending of slavery increased the spread between
rates for single and married females: married women no longer worked
women. 1951,1957: Census Bureau, Current PopulationReports, Series P-5o, no. 39,
Marital and Family Characteristics of the LaborForce:April 1951,Table2andP-5o, no. 76,
Marital Statusof Workers:March 1957,Table3.
80 (i) The crudeness of the i820datahas beenemphasized above.(2)Wemay note
thatthe i 890 and 1940 Duránd data represent the most informed and careful attempt to
provide comparability between these Census reports. (3) The i 940andi 950 data marked
"Census" are published as comparable by the Census. Two major empirical differences
separate the two sets of i 940 figures: the Durand data used here relatetonative whites,
andto allmarriedwomen, while the Census data relate to all whites, and to married
women—spousepresent. (The omission of spouse—absent in the latter group accounts for
the major incomparability inthe table—fornonwhites.)Unfortunately progress has
madeit impossible to show separate figures. for i 95off. for native whites, leading to some
incomparability with the earlier data. Data inTable 5 of Employment and Personal Charac-
teristics, however,shbw over-all worker ratesforforeign born and native whites by age.
Thetwo are within io%of each other and, given the small weight for foreign born by
1950,the incomparabilityis probably not significant. The Current Population
Surveyappears to secure more comprehensive reporting than does the census, and this
factor accounts for most of the z 950—1951 difference, rather than the impact of Korea.
Thus for March, 1950, the Census reports a worker rate of 31.8formarried nonwhites,
while the Current Population Survey, P-5o, no. 29,Table6, reports 37.0.Forwhites
the comparison was20.7and 22.8.
The precision of Consumer Population Survey worker rates for the small group of
nonwhite single females is not great but the downward drift seems unquestionable for the
years 1951—1957: 41.3; 40.8;38.6;43:4; 35.9; 35.6; 37.9. One cause of this drift
(the 1953—1954 rise probably reflects the energetic control and enumerative efforts
associated with the new sample introduced in that period) was the rise in school attendance
rates for nonwhite females, these rates rising toward the levels for whites. School enroll-
ment of nonwhite females 14—17 rose from 71.9 to 81.1%between '95° and 1956.Cf.
Census Bureau, Current Population RepOrts, P-2o, flOS. 34 and 74.
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in as great numbers as single women. Beginning from the first date of a
free market shown in Table 2, however, the differential declined sharply
from• 1890 to 1940, and continued to decline thereafter.
For the native-white versus foreign-born white comparison, the initial
contrast was far smaller and the convergence far less.For the foreign
group as a whole, rates were almost half again above the native in 1890,
wereabout a quarter below the native by 1940.82This narrowing
occurred primarily in the younger age groups. Durand suggests that
selective immigration was a significant factor at work in the 14—19 age
groups.83 In any event, the spread for each of the age groups under
diminished markedly, whereas those for the older ages changed little or
increased somewhat. This contrast suggests the greater flexibility, the
prompter adoption of American standards by the younger groups, and
the contrasting reluctance to change on the part of those whose work
patterns tended to be formed abroad or in large foreign-born enclaves
in this country.
Third, we can note that white male-female worker rate differentials
narrowed considerably:over-all male rates changed very little, while
female rates rose greatly. For nonwhites, however, no narrowing since
1865 can be demonstrated.
The trend in fertility rates was also toward a reduction in differentials.84
We are fortunate here in having two different time dimensions, unlike the
worker rate area where our measure only describes activity in a limited
period. And in these data it is clear that the phenomenon of convergence
also occurs, not as anything inevitable or mystical, but simply as an
aspect of human adjustment in a free social and economic market.
Table iindicates that the differential between white and nonwhite
women born in the most recent period was markedly under that for those
born in earlier years. By referring to Table 3, we can go on to see the
impact of the free market. For 1850 and i86o the white and nonwhite
fertility rates (measured in terms of number of children under 5 at the
Census date) were much the same.85 With the end of slavery a dramatic
change occurred: fertility rates among nonwhites ranged from 20 to 30
82Theseand related data are summarized conveniently in Durand, op. cit., p. 49 and
216f.
83ibid.,p. 49.
84Thesubject is discussedinfuller detail in Charles Westoff, "Differential Fertility in
the United States: igoo to 1952," American Sociological Review, October, '954.
85Weassume that the Census need not be corrected any more for the omission of
slaves than of whites. The wisdom of this assumption, as noted earlier, in preference to
the procedure of using the higher rate indicated by the i925—1930study, is that masters
would rarely be ignorant of the total count of slaves, and, in addition, would be seriously
interested in a full count for purposes of Congressional representation.
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per cent above those for whites in the next two or three Censuses.86 The
rates then began to converge toward virtual identity in 1920.Thesub-
sequent impact of the depression is well known and here we can contrast
(a) the short-term impact that made birth rates for the two groups
diverge markedly, from (b) the longer-run tendency (indicated by data
on completed fertility) toward a reduced differential.
Within the white group differentials between regions and states
diminished. A single indication is given by the relationship between two
regional average for children under 5
per i,ooowomen was one of the highest in the nation in i8oo,and was
still one of the highest in 1950.NewEngland ranked among the lowest
at each date. But while the former rate was about 6o per cent above
that for New England in i8oo it ran only about 20percent more in 1950.
Moregenerally, one may note that a very clear inverse correlation exists
between the state-by-state averages of fertility rates in 1870-1910andthe
declines from that level to the 1910—1940levels.87
The causes of such convergence were primarily social and economic. In
the social area we are dealing with the steady endeavor of marginal
groups to adopt the dominant American standards—migrants forsaking
their work patterns88 as well as food intake patterns, changing the desired
dimensions of their family and of their clothes. In the economic area, the
endeavors of the employer to secure low-cost labor, and of the migrant
and woman worker to secure higher incomes, joined to equalize marginal
returns by severely reducing wage differentials, affecting family incomes
and eventually family patterns of labor force participation.
Some Conclusions
This brief review of United States labor force trends in past decades has
begun from certain premises and has suggested certain inferences. Labor-
force change has been sometimes a slow, sometimes a startling, process.
In other countries and other climes there may well have been a quasi-
automatic link between population change and labor-force change. But
changing economic and social goals have precluded any such simple
86 Because of the undercount in 1870, the testimony of this Census cannot be firmly
accepted. Hence we must look to the next two Censuses for confirmation.
87 State fertility data for the two dates in an unpublished thesis by Bernard
Okun. If one simply charts his data (a) for the initial period against (b) the changes
from one period to the next, a marked inverse correlation appears. It is to be hoped that
these or similar data will become available as part of the major study on population
redistribution and economic growth being made under the direction of Simon Kuznets
and Dorothy Thomas.
88 A fascinating discussion of the occupational ladder has recently been completed
by E. P. Hutchinson in Immigrants and Their Children, Wiley, 1957.
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linkage in the United States.These changing goals have evidenced
themselves in migration, fertility, and mortality shifts that affected both
our population and our labor force.
The expansive mood of the American economy has nowhere been
better established than by the process of migration, with both human
and material resources shifting toward an ever-changing optimum. For
many decades the flood of migrants from Europe and Africa made a
substantial contribution to American• population growth. Much of this
migration (being directed toward building our canals, settling the
prairies, stocking the plantations) was very selective, tending to bring
more males than females, more adults than children. The increments to
the labor force were greater, relatively, than those to the population
totals. When railroads became a major factor, when canal construction
tapered off, and when slavery ended, migration began to include a
growing proportion of entire families rather than merely single males.
A second factor at work was the long-term downward trend in birth
rates throughout most of the nineteenth century. This decline, of course,
accompanied great absolute gains in population and the labor force.
(We need not concern ourselves here with Francis Walker's speculations
as to how great the growth might otherwise have been, the possible
substitution of immigrants for native births, and so on.) The decreases
in the United States child labor force began about 1900,aftera century
of declining birth rates, and are not particularly to be associated with
those declines.
A third major factor in population growth is that of mortality.89 But
while short-term peaks in malaria sharply affected the supply of labor in,
say, the James River and Kanawha canal, or typhoid that in New Orleans,
major changes in mortality had little historical impact on the labor force.
The unrepresentative Massachusetts data suggest that little advance was
made in the nineteenth century.°° Mortality reductions have, of course,
become a significant force for population growth in the twentieth
century.9' But they exerted little short-term impact on the labor force:
the man who enters the labor force today will provide only about io per
cent more years of work to the economy over his lifetime than did his
89Specialemphasis on mortality in its direct impact and also in the survival to repro-
ductive ages is given in K. F. Helkiner, "The Vital Revolution Reconsidered," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, February, 1957.
90Thecomplete expectation of life for white males aged 20andover in Massachusetts
changed hardly at all from 1850 to 1900.HistoricalStatistics of the United States, p. 45.
91Cf.the useful review in Mortimer Spiegelman, "Mortality Trends and Prospects
and Their Implications," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
March, 1958.
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predecessor back in 1900.92 (The long-run impact on the next generation's
supply of labor—and of population—is a further, and deeper, problem
for study.)
•Beyond these forces affecting both population and labor force change
are those that have substantially changed the labor force while bringing
only trivial changes in population. First, without question, is the ending
of slavery—and with it the sharpest fall in worker rates over the entire
record of United States experience. Thus, the over-all participation in
the labor force today is well under that prevailing in slave times.93
Second, is the decline since 1900 in worker rates for children. New value
systems—or more accurately, the wider adoption of older ones—set great
store by children not working until they had reached 8 years of age,
then io, then i6. Third, is the long-term rise in worker rates for women,
with especially pronounced gains after World Wars I and II. The con-
tribution of reductions in fertility to this rise has frequently been over-
stated—particularly given the increase since 1945 in both the number of
women with babies and with jobs. On the supply side, the rise in female
worker rates reflects the endless search for a higher standard of material
well-being, particularly that euphoric state which is felt to attach to the
possession of consumer durables. Given the concurrent shortening of the
male work week, and the reduction in income from boarders and lodgers,
rising female worker rates were the obvious means toward higher incomes.
On the demand side, women's work may be considered as a pis aller for
the traditional sources of cheap labor—slaves, immigrants, -children—as
these became increasingly exiguous.
Throughout these long years of population and labor force change,
differentials in fertility rates, as in worker rates, among the several groups
in the population were reduced.Convergence toward a standard
American pattern of fertility and labor force participation tended to
follow. That pattern was not a fixed, irretrievable one, but in the process
of change and formation as the economy and the social order continuously
developed. The process of convergence helps explain the contradiction
between what static cross-section data on worker rates and fertility
differentials tell us and what the time series on American economic
development report.Static data indicate that upper income families
92StuartGarfinkle, "Changes in Working Life of Men, 1900 to Monthly Labor
Review, March, 1955,estimatesa work-life expectation rising from 39.4 to 43.2.
This is contradictory to the estimate in the major pioneering report by P. K.
Whelpton, "Occupational Groups in the United States, 1820—1920," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, September, 1926, p. 342. The basic source of the difference
probably lies in Wheipton's use of 1870 and r88o ratios of domestic servants to population.
The present procedure would allow for a higher proportion under slavery.
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have fewer children than lower, also fewer working women. The time
series report, however, that the proportion of white women who work
has gained since 1830, the proportion of nonwhite women since the end
of slavery, and that the largest gains in fertility have occurred during the
period of marked income rise since i The only uniformity that more
or less reconciles these contradictory statements is the long-term tendency
toward a reduction of fertility and worker rate differentials among the
various social and economic groups.
Appendix A
WHITE FEMALE LABOR FORCE: 183o—195o
For 1830, at nearly the beginning of the factory system on any signifi-
cant scale, we can develop a total as the sum of four component estimates.
i. Factory workers:6o,ooo. Contemporary sources give a reasonably
complete enumeration of all females employed in cotton and woolen
mills, in the manufacture of palm leaf hats, and in the manufacture of
shoes, as well as those in industries with few female employees.94
2. Free servants:8o,ooo. The largest single group of white female
workers—servants—was estimated from a regression against the number
of white families, the relationship between the two series for 185o—193o
being a very close one. A description of procedures for estimating the
number of white families prior to 1850, and of the various sources used,
appears in Appendix B.
3. Farm workers: o. As noted above, examination of the 1820 schedules
now in the National Archives showed very few women reported as gain-
fully occupied, and virtually none in the rural areas where, if anywhere,
the farm workers would have been found. The 1870 Census (Population,
Table xxvii),thefirst showing data separately for females, showed no
female farm laborers except in the Southern states, that group clearly
being the nonwhite category. For example Indiana, with 181,491 male
farm operators in 1870 reported only 22 female farm laborers. And in
none of the Northern and Western states were any but a handful of
farmers' wives, and female family members included. Even the excellent
"U.S.Congress, Serial Set 222,223, StatisticsofManufactures, 1833. These data were
adjusted in some instances to broader totals from the immediately preceding survey by the
New York Convention of Friends of the Manufacturing Interest, Nile: Register, xui,
March—August, 1832, Addendum, p. 7.With 39,000 in cotton and hand weaving,
2,900inwool, 3,300 in palm leaf hat manufactures, and 4,800 in shoe manufacture, it was
assumed that there were no more than i o,ooo in other manufacturing, other branches
being infrequent employers of women.
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1900 Census (Population, i, Table xxxiii) shows the same pattern. There-
fore for comparability with later Censuses we include no female family
farm workers in 1830. Those who desire to include this group will have
to make estimates both for 1830 and for years in which the published
Census figures in principle include, but in practice exclude, this group.
4. Other employees:25,000.Analysisof the occupational distribution
of females beginning with i 88o—when we first have separate Census data
for females—suggests that a half-century earlier the significant occupa-
tions not covered in (i) and (2) above would have been primarily
milliners and seamstresses. An arbitrary 25,000 was added for these
latter occupations on the basis of the trend for all mantua makers, seam-
stresses, milliners, and, tailors from 1850 to i 88o.
The ratio of these figures to the number of white females io and over95
is 8 per cent.96
For 1890 we have the Census reports, while for 1950 we must adjust
the Census figures to cover the io-and-over group.97
Per cent of white females
in the. labor force




NONWHITE PEMALE LABOR FORCE: 1830—1950
Our basic source of data is the Census. The major problem in using
its reports, however, is that no Census counted among the gainfully
occupied Negro slaves the substantial number that worked as domestic
Census, Compendium, Asmall number of nonwhite employees are included
in the above estimate. The error will be small since the only group where their numbers
would be substantial—servants—was estimated soas to exclude nonwhites.
96Theseand other data refer to labor force participation as currently measured.
We know that housewives' work was important in the nineteenth-century economy, and
it is today—though omitted in our measures. The limitation is analogous to the limitation
of national income measures—and just as the income falls,Pigou's example, when a
gentlemanmarries his housekeeper, so does the labor force. Those who wish to eschew
this paradox, and market measures, can simply' take the able-bodied population, say
zo and over, as a measure of labor input. But they must do so consistently, rejecting our
current measures by the same criteria that they would adjust historical estimates.
1900Census, p. lxxxiii.
1950:Arate of 28.1 per cent for those iand over appears in 1950Census,Population,
Vol. ii,Parti,Table120.Thiswas reduced on the basis of labor force survey data.
Current Population Reports, Series P-5o, floS. 31and83, enable us to compute a ratio of
33.9 for females 14andover in August, 1950,and31.8 for females io and over. The
ratio of one rate to the other was applied to the reported Census total for iand over.
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servants.Of the two Censuses—182o and 1840—that purported to
enumerate the number of gainfully occupied slaves, that for i 840 has
various internal indications of inadequacy.(For example, examination
of the unpublished schedules shows sizable counties with no occupational
entries.)
However, an indicative estimate for 1820 can be outlined. Taking the
Census for that year, let us look to a dozen counties in which the failure
to count those occupied as domestics must be a minimal problem for our
purposes. In these counties, a very large number of slaves were recorded
in proportion to the number of adult white males. Consequently, it can
be assumed that virtually all gainfully occupied slaves in these counties
were in agriculture and few in domestic service.98
Thus, if we deduct from the total number of persons reported with an
occupation in Jones County, Georgia in 1820 the estimated number of
whites and free colored, the residual is 4,218. But the total number of
slaves aged 14 and over (males plus females) in the county was only
3,600.It is clear, therefore, that nearly all female slaves plus many (if
not all) slave children aged 8—14 were also counted among the gainfully
occupied.99 Similar net balances were computed for the other selected
counties, all indicating this type of margin.
Was an unusually high proportion of slaves gainfully occupied in these
counties? Possibly so. Yet there is no reason to believe that eleemosynary
traditions were stronger in other counties where slaves were present. We
will, therefore, take it that the proportion of female Negroes in the labor
force in these counties did riot exceed that prevailing in other counties.
We can reduce this 100 per cent ratio for females 10 + to allow for illness
and absence for other reasons, using as an empirical guide the ratios for
white males in 1850. We then arrive at something like a 95 per cent
98 The following counties were used: Jones and Jasper, Georgia; Monroe, Alabama;
Feliciana, Point Coupee, St. Charles, Louisiana;Davidson, Tennessee;St. James-
Colleton, St. Thomas, Georgetown, Beaufort, South Carolina; Wilkinson, Mississippi.
The number of white males aged io and over gainfully occupied in each county was
estimated from the proportion reported for the state in thei 850 Census—that ratio
changing little even in later years. This number was then deducted from the total (male
and female, free and slave) reported by the i 82o Census as having any occupation. Since
examinatiQn of the individual schedules now in the U.S. Archives indicated no white
women with occupations reported—and the merest handful of free colored—the balance
must have been Negro slaves.
Specific examples may make the point clearer, Micajah Pickett, Sr., of Franklin
County Mississippi, reported 27 in agriculture in 1820—a figure larger than that obtained
by counting all whites in his family aged ioandover plus all slaves 14 and over. James
Jackson, of Green County Georgia, reported, in i 840, 144 in agriculture, but had only
2 whites in his family and i 31 slaves aged i o and over. Elizabeth McLendon, of Harris
County Georgia, reported iin agriculture in 1840, but had only i white person in the
family, 10 slaves aged io and over andunder io years of age.
412POL'ULATION CHANGE AND SUPPLT OF LABOR
worker rate for Negro female slaves in the prime age group. A compatible
rate for all aged 10 and over would be go per cent.'00
The over-all rate, furthermore, has been assumed to apply equally
well both to married and unmarried female slaves. The only reasons for
married slaves to have been absent from domestic or field work more
than unmarried ones are associated with childbirth. But since Negro
children were both marketable and marketed under slavery, parturition
did not remove Negro females from the labor force engaged in the




1870—1930.Edwards,op. cit., Tables 8, zo.
i86o:i 86o Census, Population of the United States in i86o (1864) pp. 663,
667, 675. The totals reported for domestics, laundresses, and servants
were added to give an all-servants figure.
TABLE B-i






















100 Contemporarydefinitions count in the labor force all persons, apart from unpaid
family workers, if they work i hour or more during the week. Under slavery even elderly
and infirm Negroes made sufficient small contributions of labor to reach this standard.
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1850: The Seventh Census of the United States, 1850 (1854) p. lxxvi.
The i850figures relates to free males aged iand over. An estimate for
all servants was made as follows. The number of female servants in i86o
was computed as 90.6 per cent of the total, andin 1850, at 93.9 per cent.
(These percentages were estimated on the assumption of a 3.3 per cent
change from one decade to the next—the same as that occurring between
1870 and r88o.) These figures may be contrasted with percentage of 87
per cent for 1870 and roughly 84 per cent for i88o, 1890, and 1900.
1830: Estimated from the relationship for 1850—1930 between number
of white families and servants with the regression line assumed to have
a zero origin.Particular weight was given to the 1850—1860 trend in
estimating 1830, assuming that the level following 1870 was generally
higher than in prior years as nonwhite females, freed from slavery,
entered the free labor market.
WHITE FAMILIES
189o—195o: 1950 Census, General Characteristics of Families, p. 2A-8.
1790,1850, i86o:The number of free families appears in Historical
Statistics of the United States, p. 29, and minor adjustment was made for
free Negroes.
.r87o—188o: The change in the average size of family appears in 1900
Census, Supplemental Analysis, p. 382, and was used to extrapolate the
1890 average size of white families.
1800—1840:Thewhite population was divided by the estimated size of
family. The population figures were from Historical Statistics, p. 25. The
average size of family was estimated from the regression of the 1790,
1850— 1900 figures for (a) average size of family, on (b) number of children
underper i,ooo females in white families.Data on children from
Taeuber and Taeuber, op.cit.,p. 251.
COMMENT
JAMES N. MORGAN, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan
I shall not presume to criticize Lebergott's methods of measuring labor
force participation, nor his measures of fertility, but merely express my
awe that he was able to make estimates for early periods.
I have mostly a few small queries, and one or two general interpretative
comments:
Is the statement that the factories in Waltham, Lowell, etc. in 1820
offered incomes larger than the imputed value of work on the family
farm true for both wives and daughters, and what is the evidence as to
the relative rewards from factory and home work?
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A table is given on the proportion of white females aged 10andover
who were in the labor force in 1830, I8go,and 1950.Whatabout the
proportion of white males who were in the labor force at these dates?
With growing use of factory production, presumably a growing proportion
of men, too, became employed rather than self-employed.
As to the comparison between Census and Surveys of Consumer Finances
on labor force participation of married women, I have to report that the
situation is worse than Lebergott implies. The table below, which I
able to prepare and send to Lebergott only after his paper was written,
indicates that the differences are probably not due to understating of
incidental employment only in the Survey of Consumer Finances. For women'
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100.0 99.8ioo.i 100.1 100.1 100.0
Number ofcaseswhere wzfe works — 313 — 215 — 203
Per centof familieswhere wtfe
works 45.4 — 30.7— 47.5 —
Pe, centof where wzfe
works — 39.3 — 30.3 — 34.5
)'fumber of cases where there is a
wjfe present — 807 — 704 —
.
655
1 SCF:Head married, two adults present (at least) un practice, identical in almost
Census: Married, both husband and wife present Jall cases
but: SCF is spending utilts, Census is families,i.e.,only wives of family heads, not of
related secondary units.
2SurveyResearch Center Economic Behavior Program.
SCF includes a few units here with children underwhete Head is 45 or older.
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who report they worked during the last year, the two sources give quite
similar distributions on the proportion of the year worked, and full or
part time.
My table compared data from two different years, but Lebergott also
compared idata from both sources and found a similar discrepancy.
There are minor differences, including the fact that the SCF is on a
spending unit basis and the Current Population Reports on a family
basis, but these differences would not explain the apparent discrepancy
in results.
It is useful, however, to know the actual questions used, since labor
force participation has proven notoriously sensitive to the questions used,
and even to the training of the interviewers.' The Survey of Consumer
Finances has elaborated the question sequences in recent years, and the
reason for using the 1958Surveyin the table was that it used more
questions.
The sequence, coming after a whole set of questions on sources of
income, and income of the head, runs:
Did your wife have any income during the year?
If yes: Was it from wages, salary, a business or what?'
How much did she receive? (taken down for each source).
If wife had wages How many weeks did she work either full time
or salary: or part time?
When she was working did she usually work full
time or part time or what?
The Current Population Survey questions, asked for all persons 14
yearsold or over, are:
In 1957, how many weeks did ... workeither fui.l time or part time (not
counting work around the house)?(Include paid vacations and paid sick
leave.)
If none: Even though... didnot work in 1957 did he spend any time trying
to find ajob?
What was the main reason... didnot work in 1957?
(Here boxes to be checked include "ill or disabled", "keeping house",
"could not find work", etc. Presumably only "could not find work"
would result in the individual being counted in the labor force.)
It appears likely that the Kinsey-like approach of the CPS questions,
which do not ask whether the individual had any income, or even whether
1GertrudeBancroft, "Current Unemployment Statistics of the Census Bureau," in
The Measurement and BehaviOr of Unemployment, published by Princeton University Press for
the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957.
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she worked, but rather start by assuming the work and ask first how
weeks she worked, might avoid underreporting more than the SCF
sequence. They might also lead to some overreporting in CPS, but ifl
either case the CPS should then have more reports of part. time
incidental employment—and this is not the case.
We are left then with some unexplained differences. Perhaps they arise
from unemployed or self-employed women. The former are omitted
from the SCF definition of working wives. The latter may be omitted
if they do not receive an income separate from that of their husband.
After theconference, Conrad Taeuber forwarded the following
information from RobertJ. Pearl of the Census Bureau: "One
source of difference is that the Survey of Consumer Finances apparently
excluded unpaid family work (since the introductory question related to
income of the wife) whereas our survey as usual included this group. We
do not have a breakdown of unpaid family workers by marital status and
presence or absence of children, but the over-all annual worker rate for
women (per cent of female population with any work experience during
the year) would have been reduced by as much as 4 percentage points if
the unpaid group had been excluded from our figures."2
Table 4 in Lebergott's paper has some interesting aspects which were
not discussed.For instance, young and old single nonwhite women
reduced their labor force participation between 1890and1940.This
requires that they have some other source of economic support, presum-
ably their relatives. Does it also imply less available housework? And
why should the increase in participation of nonwhite women be restricted
to married women between 25 and 44 years old? Does this represent
factory work, or home work that was previously done by slaves, or what?
Is it possible that there was a slow tendency for the market place to
eliminate some nonwhite workers—the very old and the young—who had
been utilized when their marginal cost was nearly zero because of slavery,
and perhaps for a time thereafter? Were factory jobs that opened to
nonwhite women mostly those requiring the strength and stamina of
middle-aged people, such as work in commercial laundries?
Noting the large increase in the proportion of married women with
children who are in the labor force, it is possible that a desire for more
children, or higher quality children, to use Gary Becker's phrase, leads
to increased income—from the wife's work, rather than the reverse
causation where income determines the number of children? Or perhaps
2Letterfrom Conrad Taeuber to Stanley Lebergott and James N. Morgan, December
23,1958.
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children turn out to cost more than the parents anticipated, given the
standards of the culture.
Tables 7 and 8 appear to permit some spurious correlation because
durables and the debts associated with durables are mostly bought and
incurred earlier in the life cycle than a house, in many cases before the
first child is born. The house Is generally purchased later, often when
the wife has left the labor force to have children. In other words, there
are relationships of debt to home ownership and stage in the family life
cycle which may cast some doubt on the motivational interpretation
given by Lebergott that the wife will go to work to help get a car or
durable, but not for a home. Since mortgage payments are mostly made
during the period when there are small children, and this is also the
period when the wife is least able or able to work, the tables can have a
different interpretation.
I agree with the conclusion that the rise in the proportion of women in
the labor force can be attributed to "a variety of supply and demand
factors, few of which are closely associated with population changes."
A general problem of interpretation has to do with the economic
meaning of data on participation in the labor force, particularly in the
case of women, and over periods when more and more economic activity'
was being transferred from the home or farm to the factory or store.
This is not to denigrate the importance of the data, or their intrinsic
interest, but to suggest that interpretations as to motivation, or as to the
economic or welfare implications of the data, must be made in the light
of these considerations.
There is a growing body of research on the present-day motivations of
women workers, and the impact of their outside work on the home.
Certainly, when a wife works it mostly means that she and her husband
do more total work. They may also, however, use some of the earned
money to pay someone else to do housework. Or they may make use of
relatives or friends in various ways difficult to catch in the statistics.
Since leisure is also an economic good, but one with no market price nor
record of its purchase or sale, welfare implications are difficult to make.
Even the total labor force can be affected in different ways. Insofar as
women work in food-processing factories, doing for dollars what they
formerly at home without pay, their total work efforts may not
increase much, but the records will show more income and more
employment.
I do not know just how one should analyze trends in labor force, gross
national product, and the like, in 'the light of these considerations, but
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some attention might be given to adding to GNP estimates of the value
of (a) housewives' services at home, and (b) leisure, the value of the
residual of sixteen. hours a day not spent working. Trends in such a
measure in toto and relative to the total person-hours of work should be
most revealing.
JOHN DURAND, United Nations
I want to begin by talking about population and labor force relation-
ships in a more general and elementary way than Lebergott has done.
This may help to show how his contributions fit into the general picture.
In the first place, the labor force is not merely related to the population,
it is a part of the population.It is not merely influenced by demographic
variables, it is a demographic variable. Likewise the percentages of labor
force members in different sex-age groups of the population, which we
call "participation rates," are also demographic variables—not like sex
and age, which are inherent characteristics of individuals, but like marital
status or farm-residence. The participation rates have a seasonal variation
and on occasions they may change considerably from year to year, as we
saw during the war, but large short-term variations are extraordinary.
Normally these rates change slowly, and in an orderly progression; they
have a certain stability and predictability which befits a demographic
variable. Consequently, both over long and short periods, the growth of
the population is normally the main determinant of the growth of the
labor force—or rather, the growth of the adult population. If the annual
average labor force in 1956wasabout 2 per cent larger than in 1955, it
was mainly because the adult population increased roughly in that ratio;
and this is the usual state of affairs. And if we can predict the size of the
adult population in the year 2,ooo, we shall not be very far wrong in
predicting the size of the labor force.
The growth of the labor force is therefore determined primarily by the
fundamental demographic factors of fertility, mortality, and migration.
The influences of these factors can be measured in an approximate way
by the methods illustrated in Notestein's paper. In his charts, even if
they are limited to the female population, we can see in a general way
how the changes of fertility, mortality, net immigration, and also the
peculiarities of the original age structure, affected the size of the labor force
and its nhmerical relation to the total population during a 25-year period.
For a more accurate measure of the effects of these, demographic
variables, it is necessary to introduce labor force participation rates into
the calculations, and take account of the changes in these rates and their
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interaction with the changing numbers in the different sex-age groups of
the adult population.This analysis can be extended back to earlier
periods, and in this way we can get a more exact measure, for instance, of
the effect of changing fertility on the number of children in the labor
force than Lebergott has given.
For still more accurate measures, we should have to take account of
interactions between labor force participation rates on the one hand and
the fertility, mortality, and migration rates on the other hand. These
interactions, however, are of a secondary order of importance. The level
of fertility affects the participation rates of women, and vice versa.
Lebergott refers to the studies of the changes during 1890—1930and
1920—1940whichshowed that the decline of fertility could have accounted
for only a small share of the large increase in the number of working
women. Gertrude Bancroft's new book contains an analysis of the growth
of the female labor force between 1940and1950whichindicates that the
marriage and baby boom had a fairly important restraining influence,
but not enough to prevent a very large increase in the female labor force
during this decade.1
Changing mortality rates can also affect labor force participation rates
through the medium of widowhood and orphanhood, but here we are
considering influences of really small relative importance.Large-scale
immigration or emigration is more important, as it is likely that the
migrants will not only be largely in the sex-age groups to which the
highest participation rates apply, but also that their participation rates
will be higher than those of nonmigrants of the same sex and age. How-
ever, in the United States, international migration during the last 30
yearshas not been large enough to rank as a major factor.Off-farm
migration of the native population is now much more important as a
factor influencing the trend of the labor force participation rates.
It is also necessary to consider the that the participation
rates may be influenced by changes in the rate of population growth. If
the increase of the adult population lags behind the demand for labor,
participation rates may rise, and if population growth overtakes demand,
participation rates may fall.I say may; .1 do not know if it is true, and
if it is true, we have no means of estimating the amount of the effect.
Lebergott thinks that the increasing female participation rates in the last
few decades could be explained partly by the cutting off of immigration.
It may be so, but I think itis equally possible that this effect was
unimportant.
'The AmericanLabor Force, Wiley, i958.
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It isalso possible, as Lebergott says, that changes in the participation
rates for some sex-age groups tend to produce compensating changes in
other groups. He refers to increasing female rates being stimulated
partly by the loss of other customary sources of family
that is, from employed children and from lodgers.I will not take issue,
but I do not think we have any evidence of this.
On the other hand it cannot be denied that the sudden removal of
important segment of the labor force is likely to provoke an increase in
participation rates of other segments of the population. We saw this very
clearly, of course, during the war.
I am getting over now from the demographic interrelations into
"exogenous" factors, if I may be permitted to use the economists' term.
As Lebergott says, we have plenty of evidence to show that "exogenous"
factors have been responsible for the greater part of the changes of the•.
participation rates in this country during the last 8o years. Sometimes.
these nondemographic factors are lumped under the heading of "pro-
pensity";I have done this myself, but the term does not do justice to
the importance of demand factors;it implies that membership in the
labor force is open to all who wish to join, which is obviously not true—
except in the sense that anyone can get under the statistical definition by
seeking work, even if there is no demand whatsoever for his services.
There are three groups in the population whose participation rates
have been greatly affected by changing demographic and exogenous
factors: women, children, and elderly men. Lebergott has discussed the
first two; to fill out the picture I will only say that the changes in the
participation rates of males over 65 have been no less spectacular and
persistent. The decrease in average age of retirement—or relinquishment
of economic activity—has continued in the 1950's after the interruption
during the war. Bancroft's tables show only 35 per cent of white males
over 65 in the labor force in 1955, by comparison with 4! per cent in
1940 and 1950, and 67 per cent in 1890.2
In Lebergott's very interesting analysis of the trends in labor force
participation of women and children, I want only to raise questions about
a few details. For one thing, I am somewhat doubtful about the reliability
of the evidence from the censuses that child. labor was increasing during
the late nineteenth century. As for the fascinating estimates of the female
labor force in i 830, I wonder what happened to the agricultural com-
ponent, and I would be glad if he would clarify this question. One more
point:I am dubious of comparisons of female participation rates for
2TheAmerican Labor Force, Wiley, 1958.
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different groups where age is not controlled.I think this applies to the
data on indebtedness and purchases of durable goods on the part of
families with and without working wives.
In his conclusions as to the main explanations of the most recent
increase in female participation rates, Lebergott says: "On the supply
side, the incentive is to be found in the dazzling array of material goods
now incorporated into the American standard of living."
Bancroft's emphasis is a little different. She analyzed the female labor
force with regard to educational level, occupation, family-income classes,
and the like, and found that in general it is not the lower but the upper
social-economic groups who are spearheading the present female invasion
of the labor market—the Joneses themselves—those same elite pace-
makers who have been bearing the standard of the new four-child, three-
seated station wagon ideal.Bancroft says cautiously, "the data give
some support for the belief that, in addition to the need or desire for
income, other motives for labor force activity have assumed importance
in recent years."
For the economic consequences, it is pertinent to consider that in-
creasing employment of married women means an increasing frequency
of two-worker families, which has an obvious bearing on the shape of the•
family-income distribution. This is relevant, of course, to the building
of models for exploration of economic and demographic relationships,
and for prediction of future trends of consumers' expenditures, and so
forth.
I have not touched on internal migration or urban-rural and other
geographical differences in natural increase and labor force participation
rates, and there is hardly any time to talk about these matters now, but
they are obviously of capital importance for investigation of labor force
and population relationships below the national level. We now have a
rich store of material for research on these aspects of the subject in the
monumental compilation of historical data and estimates of internal
migration and labor force by states since 1870 which recently issued from
the University of Pennsylvania.3
8PopulationRedistribution and Economic Growth, United States, 1870—1950, American
Philosophical Society, 1957.
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